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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the relationship between corruption and accountability in the Pacific 
Islands, using evidence from surveys of 'national integrity systems' in 14 states. It identifies and 
assesses four international initiatives to improve accountability and reduce corruption: public 
sector reform; peer review of accountability systems; cleaning up offshore financial centres, and 
the intervention of Australian officials on the ground. The paper finds that the relationship between 
increased accountability and reduced corruption is not straightforward. Moves to improve financial 
accountability may increase the chances of corruption being detected, but greater political 
accountability may increase the incidence, or suspicion, of corruption. Comparison between the 14 
suggests that accountability and levels of corruption vary independently of each other. 
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Campaigns for ‘good governance’ often yoke accountability together with the 
reduction of corruption. The link is plausible. Officials may be less tempted by 
corruption, if they have to account for their bad behaviour to superiors. Politicians 
may think twice if they have to face voters in a subsequent election. An increase in 
accountability and the reduction of corruption are both self evidently good, so it 
makes sense for aid donors and international financial institutions to promote them 
together.  
 
Nevertheless, there are circumstances in which these two goods may conflict, or at 
least work independently or at cross purposes. For example, voters may hold a 
politician accountable for failing to provide jobs for voters. Or an authoritarian 
government, unaccountable to voters or the media, may nevertheless have a justified 
reputation for incorruptibility.  
 
This chapter tries to unpack the relationship between corruption and accountability by 
looking at patterns of corruption in the Pacific Islands, and at projects by aid donors 
and international financial agencies to make them more accountable and less corrupt.   
Neither idea – corruption or accountability – is straightforward, so we have to start 
with some discussion of what they mean in this context. Then the paper turns to 
surveys of corruption, and at attempts to introduce reform from outside, most recently 
in Australia’s police/military intervention in Solomon Islands, which having restored 
law and order, is now leading to prosecutions of police and politicians for corruption 
offences. Finally it considers what comparison between these cases can tell us about 
the relationship between corruption, anti corruption, accountability and governance. 
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption is defined differently in different countries. Few in this region have a 
specific offence of ‘corruption’ though most countries’ penal codes prohibit bribery of 
officials, and most public service regulations prohibit conflicts of interest. Papau New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have legislated codes of practice applying to 
senior officials. Offences against these codes are disciplinary offences, typically 
punished by dismissal. There is often  provision for related misbehaviour, such as 
fraud, in the private sector. 
 
The definition of corruption most used in international campaigns for good 
governance is ‘the use of public office for private gain’. It puts great stress on a 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ that is often blurred in the Pacific Islands. 
Centralised bureaucratic states, with their values of impersonality, and equal treatment 
are a recent introduction to the region.  Ethical commitments to family and kin may 
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contradict official duties, but they are not ‘private’ in an individualistic, personal 
sense. Traditional gifts and small payments to chiefs and pastors may be 
misinterpreted as bribes.  Courts in Kiribati, for example, have rules out certain kinds 
of gifts during election campaigns. One part of the region is not even nominally a 
democracy. A monarchical system of government in Tonga fuses the state with the 
private interests of the ruling family (echoed, in a weaker way, in chiefly systems of 
government, particularly at local level in other parts of the region).  
 
Most democracies in the region (except notably Fiji) have weak, non-ideological 
political parties. Even the most honest and public spirited politicians are under 
pressure to offer favours to voters, or offer inducements to legislators to hold together 
winning coalitions in parliament or congress. ‘Stronger parties’ are often seen as a 
way of reducing this kind of corruption, even though they may become corrupt 
themselves, or act as conduits for corruption.  
 
Each country’s legal system is inherited from colonial rule, and is often criticised by 
island leaders as being out of step with popular opinion. Politicans sometimes defend 
‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ behaviour that outsiders might regard as corrupt. Popular 
opinion – particular in letters to the newspaper, or street demonstrations – seems often 
to take a wider view of corruption than the law, to include what the Muslim historian 
Ibn Kaldun called ‘loose living among the elite’1 Perceptions of corruption may be 
biased against minority groups, like the Chinese traders that provide the backbone of a 
local private sector in most of the region, or foreigners, including aid donors, or 
simply the wealthy. As Krastev 2found in post-communist Balkans, unwelcome, new 
and visible inequalities of income are often more easily explained as the result of 
corruption, rather than bad luck, effort, or the working of the merit principle.  
 
Anti corruption activity does not necessarily arise as a response to a problem of 
corruption, or in proportion to it.  In the Pacific Islands, anti corruption laws and 
institutions are typically in place, but ineffective in dealing with what is regarded as a 
growing problem of corruption. It may also be that a stable level of corruption has 
become, though donor pressure, or changes in popular or elite opinion, to be regarded 
as ‘corrupt’, and in need of urgent action.  Accusations and counteraccusations of 
‘corruption’ are also part of the normal language of politics in the region, as loose 
coalition group of self interested and ideologically indistinct politicians rotates office, 
and its spoils, with one another.  
 
Accountability 
 
‘Accountability’ is, like corruption, a complex and multi-dimensional idea. Day and 
Klein3 distinguish political from financial accountability, noting that the two have 
developed in different ways. Political accountability has developed with democracy, 
and it is only towards the end of the twentieth century that democracy has come to be 
regarded as a good system of government for everyone4. Financial accountability has 
a much older history, as a way for leaders – democratically elected or not – to manage 
their subordinates. Thus colonial states in the Pacific Islands may have had strong 
systems of financial accountability (money was spend according to budgets, accounts 
were audited etc), but weak systems of political accountability (Governors were not 
elected; the franchise of legislatures was limited; information was not easily available 
to the media, or the public). In Tonga, never colonised, but not completely a 
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democracy, the auditor general is still responsible to the Prime Minister, though 
reports eventually go to parliament 5 . The two senses of political and financial 
accountability come together in the office of auditor general, supervising the 
executive but responsible to the legislature.  
 
Banks and bilateral aid agencies were reluctant to talk about corruption (but may now 
talk about it to the exclusion of other important issues). The officials who inhabit 
them are often more comfortable, and expert, in talking about financial than political 
accountability. However, some donors have become interested in the way electoral 
systems may make leaders more accountable.  In PNG, for example, the EU funded a 
publicity campaign in support of the government’s proposals to amend the 
constitution, and the election laws, to replace its first-past-the-post system with a 
‘limited preferential’ one, which would allow peoples second, third and fourth 
preferences to affect the outcome. The publicity campaign included radio talk shows, 
TV, newspaper advertisements and posters and flyers such as one setting out 'The Ten 
Commandments of PNG Democracy', including 'Thou Shall Not Vote for Self 
Interest'. The latter is a difficult sell, in any country. The legislation, which was 
successfully passed, also created incentives for MPs to join political parties.  
 
The Pacific Islands region 
 
The Pacific Islands include three groups of islands  – Melanesia, to the south west, 
Polynesia to the east, and Micronesia, which extends northwards across the equator to 
include the former US territories of Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, and 
Marshall Islands. The Polynesian islands share a common linguistic and cultural 
heritage, particularly about how leaders should behave6. The Melanesian islands by 
contrast, were settled much longer ago, and now show a huge diversity in languages 
and cultures, and styles of leadership.  Colonial rule created new divisions, but it also 
parceled islands together, and brought them under standardised systems of 
government from new administrative centres. Constitutions based on Westminster and 
Washington models embodied ideas of ‘checks and balances’ and ‘judicial 
independence’ that shape current anti corruption policies. The first constitution of the 
first country to be decolonised,  Samoa in 1962, did not address issues of corruption, 
but the idea of a Leadership Code for senior officials and politicians was introduced at 
independence in PNG in 1975 (from Africa), and then copied by Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu (though neither implemented these provisions for many years)7.  Kiribati’s 
trust fund for offshore investment provided a model for Tuvalu’s8.   
 
Now the Pacific Islands constitute a region in at least four senses. First, regional 
organisations like the Pacific Islands Forum, which consists of leaders of the island 
states, and Australia and New Zealand,   promote a sense of common identity, shared 
experience and, more recently, peer review of each other’s policies. The island states 
also form sub regional groupings in larger organisations like the Asian Development 
Bank, or the Commonwealth. During the 1990s these regional and international 
organisations became conduits for policies of ‘good governance’, including 
accountability and the prevention of corruption.  The Pacific Islands Forum has tried 
to draft a standard ‘leadership code’ to govern the activities of politicians and senior 
officials, and been promoting peer reviewed accountability principles. More recently 
several countries have come under pressure from the OECD’s Financial Action Task 
Force to clean up their offshore banking legislation. 
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Third, the Pacific Islands also constitute regions of influence for relatively powerful 
neighbours. Australia, in particular, has become more directly involved in the 
government of what it sees as potentially ‘failing’ states Solomon Islands, Nauru and 
PNG.  In 2003 it sent troops, police and other officials in ‘regional assistance mission’ 
to Solomon Islands. In each case, local corruption has provided a public justification 
for intervention New Zealand is a continuing influence on its former colonies of Niue 
and Cook Islands, where it has been increasing pressure for good governance.  There 
are many Niueans and Cook Islanders resident in New Zealand, and they influence 
political thinking back home. North of the equator, the US continues to be a powerful 
influence on the self governing states with which it has defence agreements, and a so-
called Compact of Free Association.  
 
Fourth, the Pacific Islands also constitute a region in the analytic sense. The 
combination of similarity and diversity provides opportunities for systematic 
comparison of causes and effects. Variations in some factors (resource endowments or 
electoral systems) that might affect levels, or perceptions, of corruption can be 
compared against a background of similarity. The region provides a number of cases 
in a natural experiment.  Though the experiments influence each other, and the 
number (14, listed in table 1) is still too few for statistical work, comparison usually 
turns up counterexamples to reckless generalisations from a single case. Nauru, for 
example, has had trouble with corruption in offshore investments, but Kiribati and 
Tuvalu have not. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, we look the independent states and those in free 
association with their former colonizing power, because these are the ones for which 
comparative information on corruption is available.  This excludes the remaining 
colonies and territories of the US, France and Britain (only in Pitcairn), while noticing 
that these territories have not been without corruption and other scandals (like sexual 
abuse in Pitcairn). In the 1980s, for example, scandals over land allocations in New 
Caledonia showed local officials biased towards towards white settler interests, while 
Guam and the Northern Marianas suffer from party funding scandals like those on the 
mainland US.  
 
Corruption Risks 
 
The island states of the South Pacific share many characteristics that create risks of  
political and administrative corruption9. The average GPD per capita only US 3,103 
(see table 1).  Governments dominate economic life, and politics is often a ‘means to 
personal wealth’10.  The median population is a little over 50,000 and Ministers 
involve themselves in the day to day running of government and are suspected of 
favouring their relatives and political supporters11. In small societies with strong 
cultural ties ‘there is a tendency to promote one’s own colleague or relative’ and 
‘everyone knowing each other makes the act of ignoring illegal practices easier than 
“blowing the whistle”12. Legislation inherited from the colonial period is often out of 
step with popular opinion, and with new opportunities for corruption after 
Independence. A geography of scattered islands, or inaccessible interiors of the larger 
Melanesian islands, makes the supervision of local and provincial government 
particularly difficult. 
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The timber industry has been a particular source of corruption in PNG, Solomon 
Islands and Fiji, but there are no forests to exploit in the smaller islands. Local 
opportunities for investment are so small in Polynesia and Micronesia that people 
migrate for employment, and governments invest offshore – creating another set of 
corruption risks.  Countries with democratic systems face different risks from a 
monarchy like Tonga, where the king and his ministers are only weakly accountable 
to parliament , and the royal family is involved in business ventures. Countries with 
traditions of deference towards leaders, like those in Polynesia, face different risks 
from countries, like those in Melanesia, where leadership is more contested. Weaker 
states, like Solomon Islands, find it harder to implement anti-corruption policies than 
those, like Samoa, where there is less intimidation of officials,  greater government 
stability and more bureaucratic effectiveness.  
 
The region depends heavily on foreign aid. Aid relationships are at risk of corruption, 
or suspicion of corruption. Bilateral funding may fall into some grey area outside the 
normal accountability structures of both donor and recipient governments. Though the 
multilateral banks have offices in the region they rely heavily the recipient 
government’s accountability structures. The ADB used to have a poor reputation for 
corruption in its own operations, but has recently adopted stringent policies against 
corruption in the disbursement of funds it deploys. Smaller amounts at the discretion 
of ambassadors and high commissioners, or mobilised for emergency relief, are 
sometimes, perhaps unfairly, seen as forms political patronage.  In Solomon Islands, 
for example, a Prime Minister once resigned over claims that French hurricane relief 
funds were disproportionately channeled to his own village (Solomon Islands 
politicians today are less easily embarrassed). Funding under the first Compact of 
Free Association that the US signed with its former colonies was so plagued with 
problems of accountability and suspicions of corruption that the revised Compact 
contains provision for a special audit office based in the US. 
 
Perceptions of Corruption 
 
Corruption is famously difficult to see, or measure. It typically takes place in secret, 
often between willing partners, leaving no obvious victims or a  ‘smoking gun’.  
Successful prosecutions are difficult to achieve, and may bear an inverse ratio to the 
underlying rate. Countries with the fewest prosecutions may have the most corruption, 
and vice versa.  Measurment then turns to perceptions, which may be based on 
different understandings of what counts as corruption. As with the distinction made 
between ‘crime’ and the ‘fear of crime’ -  which may move independently, or in 
opposite directions -  people may perceive there is more corruption than there actually 
is (if the real rate could ever be discovered). Newspaper reports are usually based on 
government and court information.  Competition for readers may lead to an 
exaggeration of the extent of corruption. Equally, reporting may be inhibited by 
government censorship, or self-censorship, fear of loss of advertising (government 
and private) or intimidation by cronies of those accused.  Local journalists in Palau 
and Solomon Islands have suffered physical intimidation. 
 
Corruption is easily blamed on foreigners, or trading minorities.  Contradicting the 
cultural defence sometimes offered politicians, popular opinion also often casts the 
net of corruption widely, to include the sexual misbehaviour of elites, or inequalities 
of lifestyle: large cars, and foreign travel. In Solomon Islands, Roughan describes a 
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state of mind of ‘insidious tolerance’ – every official is regarded as on the take, but no 
one feels anything can be done about it13.  
 
Of the 14 countries we are comparing, only PNG has featured in the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – coming in at 102 of 145 
countries surveyed in 2004,  tied with Eritrea, Philippines, Uganda, Vietnam and 
Zambia14. TI’s CPI is based on opinions expressed in at least three existing surveys by 
ratings agencies, academics and journalists, and there are insufficient survey data 
available to rank the other countries.  It is concerned with the kinds of corruption that 
worry business. Perceptions of corruption may over or underestimate the real amount, 
but still have an impact on decision to invest.  These decisions are not only those of 
international investors – perceptions, or more direct experience, of corruption may 
force local investors offshore. There is, for example, anecdotal evidence of substantial 
investment from PNG into real estate in Queensland.  
 
Surveys of National Integrity Systems 
 
TI’s ‘national integrity systems’ (NIS) surveys are an effort to counter criticism that 
the CPI rankings were failing to grasp the particularities of each country, relied too 
much on external perceptions, and failed to identify opportunities for improvement  
(or register them in the index, if improvement were made).  Instead, the NIS studies 
assess the several ‘pillars’ of national integrity – parliament, Ombudsman etc - and 
look for differences between what is there in theory, and what happens in practice.  A 
local consulting firm surveyed Fiji in 2001. PNG was surveyed by two PNG 
academics in 2003, and the remaining 12 small island states were surveyed by 
academics or former local officials in 2004, in a project I coordinated with Manu 
Barcham at the Australian National University.  The Fiji and PNG projects were 
organised by local TI groups, while the NISPAC project was organised by TI 
(Australia) with funding from the Australian government’s aid agency, AusAID.  
 
PNG and Fiji are the two largest countries in the region, and Fiji the most 
commercially developed, so it makes some analytic sense to deal with them separately 
from the twelve smaller states we later surveyed. Nevertheless there are similarities as 
well as differences between the findings. The differences also have much to do with 
the authorship of the individual country reports. Some were academics, looking from 
outside, sometimes unwilling to apply external standards of judgement. Others were 
by former officials, or retired local officials, who tended to be angrier and less 
forgiving.  
 
The word ‘corruption’, in English, implies a falling away or derogation from some 
purer situation. The unstated ideal of each NIS report was of an impartial, impersonal, 
tenured civil service, whose officials would be uncontaminated by personal, familiar 
regional or ethnic loyalties, one the one hand, or political pressures on the other.  This 
idea goes back at least to Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, while the division 
between ‘public administration’ and politics is the one pushed by reformers in the late 
nineteenth century US. In some lights, it also looks like the colonial state, and there is 
nostalgia in parts of PNG for the supposed incorruptibility of colonial officials (and 
some forgetting of the racial biases of colonial administration, its opacity, and the way 
European business interests were often preferred over local).  
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The PNG report found that corruption ‘has saturated many aspects of the public and 
private sectors’, while most government institutions were ‘passive and tolerant’ 
towards it15. It devoted more attention than the others to political corruption, and the 
government’s attempts to restrict it through reform of the electoral system, campaign 
financing, and the strengthening of political parties 
 
The NISPAC study of twelve small states found government ministers particularly at 
risk of corruption. It reported complaints about favoritism towards relatives in 
appointments, contracts and travel. Particular government departments were more 
vulnerable to corruption than others: the police, the customs service; forestry and 
fisheries; ports; health and education.  Retirement funds and offshore banking were 
often involved in cases of corruption.  In very small countries, there was often little to 
sell but the symbols and tokens of sovereignty, like stamps, work permits and 
passports.  It was sometimes not clear if this trade was for the benefit of individual 
ministers and officials, or sanctioned by the parliament as a source of government 
revenue.  Offshore banking brought governments into close contact with an 
international underworld of tax avoidance money laundering.  Again corruption by 
senior officials sometimes blended into an authorised search for government revenue, 
trading on the country’s status as an independent sovereign state. 
 
Visible petty corruption – routine payments for services that officials already received 
salaries to perform – was an issue in only three countries (Samoa, Tonga and Palau) 
though in PNG the police sometimes exacted small payments at roadblocks.  Under 
the headings of ‘kickbacks’ the Fiji report found public officials 
‘imposing/demanding extra levies for services they are expected to deliver in the 
normal course of their duties’, particularly in the issuing of passports, work permits, 
driving licenses and vehicle certification16.  The PNG report found officials ‘hinting 
their willingness to be bribed, either an invitation to lunch or “six packs” [of beer] and 
“bus fares” in return to speed up inquiries and service delivery processes”.  There was 
also abuse of powers to administer on the spot fines. Officials were also using their 
official vehicles to carry out private businesses. In PNG 
 
It is not uncommon to sight ‘Z’ plated government owned vehicles dropping 
off vendors with their cooling boxes and marketing tables as strategic 
locations17 
 
The Fiji report also found nepotism and cronyism, particularly in the use of powers of 
appointment delegated from the Public Service Commission as part of an earlier 
public sector reform program. This was sometimes hard to distinguish these incidents 
from policies of ‘positive discrimination’ or ‘affirmative action’ on behalf of 
marginalised groups – a contentious issue in Fiji, where the supposed economic 
disadvantage of indigenous population has been an issue in coups d' etat in 1987 and 
2000. The National Bank of Fiji was massively defrauded, in a post coup climate 
where affirmative action was applauded. 
 
Not all the news was bad. The NISPAC reports found oversight institutions generally 
weak, though the courts remained largely free of suspicion of corruption (except 
perhaps in Fiji)18.  
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International Initiatives to Increase Accountability and the Prevent Corruption 
 
Several regional and international initiatives have linked accountability and 
corruption prevention, more or less explicitly since the 1990s. Public sector reform 
has been promoted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Improved accountability has been  promoted by 
Australia, though the Pacific Islands Forum. A crackdown on offshore financial 
centres has been  promoted by the OECD. Recently Australia has provided soldiers, 
policemen and other government officials to ‘strengthen’ institutions in Solomon 
Islands, PNG and Nauru.  
 
1. Public Sector Reform by the ADB the World Bank and the IMF 
 
Fiscal crises in the mid 1990s led Cook Islands, Solomon Islands to turn to the ADB 
for loans and technical assistance. In a short period, the ADB made six program loans, 
each conditional on public sector reform. The conditions in Cook Islands drew 
particularly on New Zealand experiments in 'New Public Management' and were 
transmitted to Vanuatu, as the same consultants moved from one job to the next.  
 
Loan conditions typically included asset sales, downsizing, the introduction of Value 
Added Tax, and output budgeting. Existing heads of department were to be removed, 
and their jobs advertised, though most in Cook Islands got them back. New 
consultation and accountability mechanisms were to be introduced, such as national 
summits with the private sector and NGOs.  
 
Cash flow problems brought PNG  to the World Bank in 199419. The first slice of a 
loan was released in 1995, but negotiations over the rest dragged on through the 
1990s.   The strongest points of contention were land and forestry policy. The Forest 
Industry was notoriously corrupt, and politicians were often involved in negotiations 
between local landowners and foreign timber companies.  The World Bank pushed to 
make reform of the statutory body responsible for forestry policy and condition on the 
loan, and PNG ministers resisted.  Negotiations broke down, amid accusations from 
PNG that the World Bank was interfering with domestic policy (and the picture was 
further complicated by the defection of the World Bank’s chief negotiator to the PNG 
side) 
 
However a change of government bought both sides back to the table.   In March 
2000, the PNG government signed a letter of intent with the IMF and reinstated the 
previous export regime for logs, funded an inspection service, and declared a 
moratorium on new permits. It also promised to require more transparency from the 
Forestry Board.  A $90 million loan from the World Bank contained four new second 
tranche conditions about forestry. Meanwhile, the World Bank official who had 
changed sides had been arrested on charges of tax evasion.  
 
There is an uneasy relationship between the wave of public sector reforms and 
corruption. In many ways the objectives of reform were consistent (and if corruption 
is regarded simply as a problem for the public sector, then reducing the size and scope 
of that sector will, by definition, reduce opportunities for it). But if corruption is also 
imagined to take place within the private sector, and within NGOs then the net effect 
may be nil. The reports also found the process of privatisation very vulnerable to 
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corruption.  There was suspicion and controversy over the sale of a government 
owned tourist hotel in Cook Islands, and over the sale of the PNG Banking 
Corporation in PNG. Processes of deregulation also increased opportunities for 
cronyism and nepotism in Fiji.  
 
2. Peer Review of Accountability by the Forum 
 
Recently Australia has been using the Forum to press island states to improve their 
system of governance.  The Forum has attempted to sign its members on to a common 
leadership code (something Australian parliaments have often found difficulty 
applying to themselves). So far, ministers have rejected the draft proposed. The 
Forum has also been promoting a process of ‘peer review’ of countries success in 
implementing ‘eight principles of accountability’ that they have jointly affirmed 
support for.  These combine political and financial accountability. They do not deal 
directly with corruption, though their adoption might make it less likely, or easier to 
detect: 
 
1. Budget processes, including multi-year frameworks, to ensure 
Parliament/Congress is sufficiently informed to understand the longer term 
implications of appropriation decisions. 
 
2. The accounts of governments, state-owned enterprises and statutory corporations 
to be promptly and fully audited, and the audit reports published where the 
general public can read them 
 
3. Loan agreements or guarantees entered into by governments to be presented to 
Parliament/Congress, with sufficient information to enable Parliament/Congress 
to understand the longer term implications. 
 
4. All government and public sector contracts to be openly advertised, competitively 
awarded, administered and publicly reported. 
 
5. Contravention of financial regulations to be promptly disciplined. 
 
6. Public Accounts/Expenditure Committees of Parliament/ Congress to be 
empowered to require disclosure. 
 
7. Auditor General and Ombudsman to be provided with adequate fiscal resources 
and independent reporting rights to Parliament/Congress. 
 
8. 8 Central bank with statutory responsibility for non-partisan monitoring and 
advice, and regular and independent publication of informative reports. 
 
The Forum’s Financial and Economic ministers have signed up to these principles, 
and are meant to report to each other on progress in adopting them. The pace, 
however, has been slow. A ‘stocktake’ of the process found agreements made at the 
Forum were not being well communicated and implemented back home20.  Another  
stocktake two years later found some changes, mainly to legislation, but only among 
the seven  countries who replied to the questionnaire. The main constraints were lack 
of political will, technical capacity and human resources21. 
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The Forum principles are directed at the public sector, and representative democracy. 
They are not intended to have purchase on corruption within the private sector, or 
NGOs like churches. Several principles – merit appointments, prompt reporting, 
punishment apply across sectors, while shareholders meetings, and congregations may 
play analogous roles to legislatures in ensuring accountability. Publicity also provides 
opportunities for media interest and more direct forms of democracy – including, in 
the last instance, riots that followed disclosures by the Ombudsman about losses from 
the National Provident Fund in Vanuatu. 
 
3. Cleaning up Offshore Financial Centres 
 
The Group of Seven rich countries set up a Financial Action Task Force attempting to 
persuade the governments which sponsored Offshore Financial Centres to regulate 
them more closely. Among their targets were OFCS in Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, 
Niue, Nauru, and Palau22.  OFCS have been one of the ways in which island states, 
with few other development opportunities, can trade on their sovereignty by providing 
more permissive tax and identification regimes than richer countries do. The OECD 
was originally concerned with loss of tax revenues, but since 9/11 has shifted its 
emphasis to money laundering which is 'the process of converting cash, or other 
property, which is derived from criminal activity, so as to give it the appearance of 
having been obtained from a legitimate source'23.   
 
The Financial Action Task Force tried to get governments to adopt what it called its 
'Forty Recommendations’, which included obligations to criminalise laundering the 
proceeds of serious crimes, to require financial institutions to be able to identify their 
clients, and to report suspicious transactions. Governments were to introduce systems 
to control financial institutions, and to enter into treaties allowing international 
cooperation.  
 
They published annual lists of 'non-cooperative' countries, starting in 2000. The US 
also sharply increased its own pressure on the OFCs, as part of its counter- terrorist 
activity after September 11 2001. Among South Pacific countries, Cook Islands, 
Marshall Islands, Niue and Nauru appeared on the first FATF list. Listing invoked 
countermeasures included warning non-financial businesses dealing with listed 
countries that the transaction might run the risk of money laundering.  In December 
2001, FATF members agreed to apply additional countermeasures to Nauru for its 
failure to abolish 400 shell banks, which had no physical presence in the country.  
 
Australia then found itself in an awkward position. Nauru had agreed to act as a 
processing centre for intercepted asylum seekers heading for Australia. In exchange 
Australia had offered aid and help in lobbying to have Nauru taken off the FATF 
blacklist (Sydney Morning Herald 25 June 2002).  As of March 2004 (the latest 
figures available on FATF’s website) and in spite of passing domestic legislation 
against money laundering, Cook Islands and Nauru remained on the FATF blacklist, 
but Marshall Islands and Niue had been removed.   As Nauru drifted towards 
bankrupty it has agreed to the appointment of Australian officials to positions in its 
government  
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4. Australian action against ‘state failure’ 
 
In 2003, after steadily turning back earlier requests from the Solomon Islands Prime 
Minister, Australia it responded to a call to launch a ‘regional Assistance mission’ 
(RAMSI) to restore law and order, and ‘rebuild’ institutions.  Solomon Islands had 
suffered a period of what was called ‘ethnic tension’ before a police led coup d’etat in 
2000 forced the then Prime Minister to resign. Though a civilian government stayed 
in place, and a general election held, officials, including those responsible for paying 
out money, continued to be intimidated by thugs and gangs often believed to be linked 
to political leaders. RAMSI has largely restored law and order and has turned its 
attention to supporting institutions involved with finance, accountability, and the 
prevention of corruption. Solomon Islands already has a Leadership Code 
Commission, for example, but it has been reluctant to prosecute, and underresourced24.  
Australia has been providing funding and technical assistance so that several hundred 
Solomon Islands police and others now face corruption charges brought under local 
legislation. The Solomon Islands government which invited the intervention contained 
ministers who were widely suspected of corruption, and there is the beginning of a 
backlash among some MPs. An Australian policeman on patrol in the capital was 
recently murdered by a sniper.  Australian has not set a deadline for the withdrawl of 
RAMSI, but a figure of ‘10 years’ is often mentioned. 
  
Nauru used to have one the highest per capita income of the island states, as a 
consequence of phosphate mining (see Table 1). Corruption and mismanagement of 
its offshore investment portfolio and regional airline have led to Nauru’s near 
bankruptcy, its acceptance of a new role as prison for ‘boat people’ seeking asylum in 
Australia, and the placement of Australians into senior official positions on the island. 
In PNG, like Nauru a former Australian colony, an ‘Enhanced cooperation Program’ 
has seen Australian police on patrol in the PNG capital, and Australian officials in 
‘line’ positions in PNG government departments. There is also now an Australian 
police commissioner in Fiji.  
 
Governance 
 
Governance is a word with several meanings25. The reforms described above are 
concerned with governance in several senses. One is borrowed from the professions 
of accounting and audit, and is concern with the responsibilities of boards of directors, 
and structures of accountabilibity.  It can be seen, for example, in the Public 
Expenditure Review Committee which brought private accountants in to oversee 
public expenditure in Cook Islands. Another draws on constitutional law, and is 
concerned with the role of parliament, politicians, and public oversight. It can be seen 
in provisions for legislative oversight of the executive in PNG and other constitutions. 
A third, from political science, sees governance as ‘order without hierarchy’, achieved 
in stateless society, and the decentralised world of international relations. It is 
expressed in the ‘peer review’ processes of that association of sovereign states, the 
Pacific Islands Forum.  It is related to a fourth, from economic sociology, that points 
to the interaction between markets, governments and communities. It can be seen, in 
the ADB’s insistence on involving the private sector and NGOs in reform efforts. It 
points away from the idea that corruption is a problem of government, and to the 
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possibility of corruption within the private sector, and within NGOs, including 
churches. 
 
The international, regional and Australian approaches differed in the kind of sanctions 
and pressure they could bring on governments reluctant to reform. In the first case, 
governments need loans to get them through fiscal crises, and reform became 
conditional on the loans. In the second there was reliance on a steady deluge of 
consultations, reports and reviews in which countries were supposed to shame each 
other. In the third case, recalcitrant governments were blacklisted and eventually 
boycotted by the banks, which they regularly had to deal with. In the fourth case, 
Australia has intervened directly, with the host government’s permission, grudging in 
PNG and Nauru, welcoming in Solomon Islands. In Solomon Islands it has also sent 
soldiers, wore a cloak of regionalism, and involved neighbours, whereas the 
placement of Australian officials in line positions, including police in PNG, has been 
bilateral. 
 
Accountability and Corruption 
 
The Forum’s 8 principles trace a complex relationship between financial and political 
accountability and the prevention or detection of corruption.  Principles 1, 3, 6 and 7 
of the go to the power of a democratically elected legislature over the executive and 
the bureaucracy. However the NIS surveys show that legislature may be the source of 
corruption as much as a check on it. The NISPAC report criticised what was called 
‘pitch and catch’ budgeting in former US territories where congressmen voted for 
projects in their own constituencies. In PNG and Solomon Islands politicians have 
wrested control of part of the budget from the finance department, in the form on 
constituency development funds (in principle, however, they remain accountable for 
how these funds were spent, though payments were hard to track). 
 
Principle 2 mixes financial and political accountability – with the latter direct to the 
public, rather than mediated by the legislature. Principle 8 points in another direction 
– against executive and legislative control of an independent central bank (though this 
undemocratic feature is moderated by the principle of publication, which opens up the 
possibility of post hoc criticism and questioning). However, the publication of reports 
cited in 2 and 8 may have little effect on a public unable through illiteracy to read 
them or indifferent to their findings.  
 
Some principles clearly point to the discovery of corruption once it has taken place, or 
its punishment (5). Principle 5 – providing for open competitive selection -  would 
restrict the opportunities for nepotsim, before they happened (though it still may be 
the case that someone’s relatives are more alert to job advertisements, and well 
qualified, leaving the impression of nepotism). 
 
Comparison of the 14 (see Table 2) countries shows political accountability and 
perceptions of corruption often ran together: politicians needed to promise services to 
voters, and exchange favours in parliament to secure the passage of legislation. A free 
media reported on suspicions, and on the cases that occasionally worked their way 
through the legal system.  
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In the least politically accountable country, Tonga, the royal family’s involvement in 
the ownership of infrastructure created suspicion of grand corruption. The 
government’s recent moves to control the media, on the grounds of its disrespect, 
added to suspicions. 
 
Samoa has had a single party in government since the late 1980s, and this stability is 
often credited for its relatively high growth rates. There were strong suspicions of 
corruption in the 1990s, voiced by the auditor general, whom the legislature tried to 
silence. The government is perceived (by the NISPAC report) to have become less 
corrupt since then.  
 
Fiji has been moving in the other direction, particularly since the coup d’etat in 1987. 
Pressures for affirmative action on behalf of indigenous Fijians have created new 
opportunities for corruption. 
 
Among the smaller countries, it is hard to make summary comparative judgements 
about the level of accountability and corruption.  Comparison between how they 
manage offshore investments points to the importance of insulating investment 
decisions from ministers.  Nauru’s ministers picked and chose investments in airlines 
and hotels, and were often exploited by middle men.  Their secrecy added to 
suspicions. Kiribati and Tuvalu preferred a hands-off approach, through autonomous 
corporations using professional advisers, and their funds have held up.  
 
Efforts by donors and international financial institutions have had contradictory 
effects. The Public Sector Reforms aimed, among other things, to improve financial 
accountability, and budget control, which would thereby reduce opportunities for 
corruption (and in PNG to protect the forests which had been a source of corruption). 
Deregulation increased opportunities of nepotism in appointments. But the process of 
privatisation produced opportunities and deep popular suspicion.  
 
The Pacific cases also show a sharp tendency towards greater international 
intervention, both to clean up OFCS, and to restore financial rather than political 
accountability. The Forum process has tried to use peer review to achieve a mix of 
political and financial accountability, with (according to its own reviews) very limited 
success.  The threat of commercial boycotts has brought about legal changes in OFCS. 
And Australia’s direct intervention in Solomon Islands is bringing a backlog of cases 
to the courts.  
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Table 1 
 
 
Pacific Islands Population Average Annual Growth Rates and GNP per capita 
 
 
 Population26 
(2004, estimated) 
GNP per capita  
$ US purchasing Power 
parity27 
(2000) 
Melanesia 
 
  
Papua New Guinea 7,236,000 2180 
Solomon Islands  589,700 1710 
Vanuatu 289,400 2960 
Fiji 891,100 4480 
Average  2833 
 
Polynesia 
 
  
Samoa 182,700 5050 
Tonga 98,300 1660 
Cook Islands 14,000 5000 
Tuvalu 9,600 1100 
Niue 1,600 3800 
Average  2768 
 
Micronesia 
 
  
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
112,700 2000 
Kiribati 166,100 950 
Marshall Islands 55,400 1600 
Palau 20,700 9000 
Nauru 10,100 5000 
Average  3710 
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Table 2 
 
Accountability and Corruption 
 
 
 More accountable 
 
Less accountable  
More Corrupt Solomon Islands 
PNG 
Vanuatu 
Cook Islands 
Tonga 
Fiji (after 1987 coups) 
Nauru? 
Samoa (1990s) 
Less Corrupt Niue 
Tuvalu 
Palau 
FSM 
Samoa (2000s) 
Marshall Islands? 
Kiribati? 
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